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Abstract
According to a mainstream position in contemporary cognitive science and philosophy, the use
of abstract compositional concepts is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the presence of
genuine thought. In this article, we show how the ability to develop and utilise abstract conceptual
structures can be achieved by a particular kind of learning agents. More specifically, we provide
and motivate a concrete operational definition of what it means for these agents to be in possession
of abstract concepts, before presenting an explicit example of a minimal architecture that supports
this capability. We then proceed to demonstrate how the existence of abstract conceptual structures
can be operationally useful in the process of employing previously acquired knowledge in the face
of new experiences, thereby vindicating the natural conjecture that the cognitive functions of
abstraction and generalisation are closely related.
Keywords: concept formation, projective simulation, reinforcement learning, transparent arti-
ficial intelligence, theory formation, explainable artificial intelligence (XAI)
1 Introduction
1.1 Objectives
According to a mainstream position in contemporary cognitive science and philosophy, the use
of abstract compositional concepts is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the presence
of genuine thought (see, e.g., Bermu´dez (2003), Carruthers (2009), Evans (1982)). Indeed, the
verifiable possession of compositional concepts is widely forwarded as a criterion that needs to
be satisfied before any substantive doxastic states can be legitimately attributed to non-human
animals (see, e.g., Carruthers (2009); Davidson (1975); Dreyse (2011)). If one takes this kind of
position seriously (as many do), it follows that any system genuinely deserving of the name ‘artificial
intelligence’ will possess the ability to effectively traffic in abstract conceptual representations of
salient features of its environment. (Indeed, numerous variations of this view have already been
articulated and defended in the foundations of AI literature, e.g., Bengio et al. (2013); Lake et al.
(2015)). In this paper, we address this observation by constructing an explicit example of a simple
learning agent that autonomously identifies abstract variables in the process of learning about its
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environment, before providing a concrete operational semantics that allows external observers to
subsequently identify these variables through analysis of the agent’s internal deliberative structures.
Moreover, we demonstrate how an agent’s ability to construct and employ these abstract conceptual
structures correlates with its ability to employ previously acquired knowledge when dealing with
novel experiences.
Beyond the motivation of constructing AI systems that satisfy the criterion of possessing ab-
stract compositional conceptual structures, we take the significance of this work to be twofold.
Firstly, by constructing learning agents that are capable of discovering abstract variables in a way
that can be objectively identified in subsequent analysis, we take a meaningful step towards devel-
oping artificial agents whose reasoning processes are fully transparent, interpretable and communi-
cable. Unlike conventional reinforcement learning algorithms, which do not develop any discernible
conceptual structures and do not support any meaningful interpretation of what they have learned
(see, e.g., Sutton and Barto (1998); Wiering and van Otterlo (2012)), the agent proposed in the
present work structures the information that it gathers in a way that supports an operational
interpretative semantics, which is an important first step towards combining the efficient learning
abilities of reinforcement learning agents with explicit and communicable symbolic deliberations.
The second point of significance is our observation that agents that have identified abstract
variables perform noticeably better at tasks that require them to generalise existing knowledge to
deal with new experiences. This both provides a novel operational vindication for the pragmatic
and epistemic value of abstract conceptual representations, and solves an existing operational
problem regarding the ability of reinforcement learning agents to successfully generalise.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the kind of learning environment
used to investigate the formation and identification of abstract variables. In section 3, we introduce
the particular type of reinforcement learning agent to be deployed in those tasks (namely ‘Projective
Simulation’ agents) before presenting a novel modification to the architecture of those agents,
which provides them with the necessary ‘cognitive space’ for variable identification. In section 4
we formally specify what it means for such an agent to identify variables in the context of the
learning tasks described in section 2. In section 5 we present the results of our simulations, which
illustrate the efficacy of our variable identification protocol. In particular, subsection 5.3 analyses
the observed correlation between the existence of identifiable variables in an agent’s deliberations
and the ability of that agent to deal with novel experiences in an effective manner. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Learning Environment
2.1 Basic Structure
Our central aims are (i) to enable a learning agent to infer the existence of unobserved variables in
a complex environment via dynamic interactions, and (ii) to subsequently develop an operational
semantics that allow us to identify a representation of these variables in the agent’s internal delib-
eration structures. Towards this end, we consider an environment that consists initially of three
components:
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• A set S of possible setups, i.e., situations on which experiments can be performed. For
example, in a context in which the agent is allowed to perform simple classical physical
experiments on a range of different objects, each setup s ∈ S could represent one object.
More generally, each setup s represents a different situation that the agent can test via a
range of experiments, such that each situation can be distinguished by the results it yields in
at least some of the available experiments.
• A set E of experiments, i.e., tests that can be performed on any of the available setups. For
example, in the case in which the agent can perform classical physical experiments on objects,
one possible experiment could be suspending a given object from a spring and recording by
how much the spring is extended.
• A set P of predictions such that each p ∈ P corresponds to a prediction of the outcome of
exactly one experiment in E . For example, if one of the available experiments is to measure
the spin of a particle along the y-axis, then P would contain one prediction corresponding
to the ‘spin down along the y-xis’ outcome and one prediction corresponding to the ‘spin up
along the y-axis’ outcome.
A few additional comments regarding the predictions are in order. Since, by assumption, each
prediction p ∈ P corresponds to exactly one experiment e ∈ E , one can think of p as including a
specification of which experiment it pertains to. A prediction p is then deemed ‘correct’ for a given
setup s if, under the experiment e for which p is a possible prediction, the setup s indeed produces
the corresponding outcome. Note that, in what follows, we make the simplifying assumption (to
be relaxed in future work) that the outcomes of experiments are deterministic, i.e., that each
setup/experiment pair predetermines a unique correct prediction. Moreover, we assume that P
contains a complete set of the possible outcomes for every e ∈ E , in the sense that there can be
no combination of a setup s ∈ S and an experiment e ∈ E performed on it such that the resulting
outcome is not among the predictions P. (One can ensure that this holds true even in pathological
cases, such as an attempt to measure the spin of a particle in the eventuality that no particle is
present, by formally including one prediction to the effect of ‘not applicable’.)
Once the environment has been fully specified via a choice of S, E and P, agents interact with
it in the following way. Each round of interaction begins with the agent being presented with a
single setup s ∈ S that is drawn from a fixed probability distribution over S, which we assume to
be uniform.1 Upon being presented with s, the agent is asked to make a prediction p ∈ P (which,
as detailed above, implicitly includes a choice of an experiment e). Finally, the agent receives a
reward if and only if their prediction is correct for the setup. For example, the agent could be
presented with a particular object s and asked to make a prediction for any one of the available
experiments that could be performed on that setup, i.e., placing it on a scale. They would then be
rewarded if and only if their prediction matched the outcome of that experiment, i.e., the readout
on the scale.
The above learning environment is reminiscent of classic reinforcement learning tasks, in which
success is equated with efficiently learning how to choose the correct option (prediction) for all
1Again, the uniformity of the distriution over setups is a simplifying assumption that will be relaxed in future work.
We restrict ourselves to the simplest case here in order to focus on the central theme of conceptual abstraction without
unnecessary technical distractions.
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possible inputs (setups), i.e., with efficiently learning how to maximise rewards. However, in
our approach, this is only the first step of what constitutes successful learning. Rather than
merely learning how to make correct predictions, our central success criterion is that the agent
develop transparent and easily interpretable conceptual representations of those aspects of their
environment that play a role in determining the outcomes of experiments.
To make this success criterion precise, we will introduce one additional component in our
description of the environment. It is based on the observation that each setup could be uniquely
identified by a specification of the values of a number of suitable abstract variables, e.g., the size,
shape and composition of an object. Crucially, we do not assume that the agent can perceive the
values of these variables, or even that they are aware of the fact that a description of the observed
setup can be compressed in such a way. Our goal is precisely to construct an agent that can infer
the existence of such variables even if the setups are presented as mere atomic labels that carry no
intrinsic meaning. Formally, we assume that, in addition to the three components S, E ,P specified
above, the environment also contains a ‘hidden’ fourth component, namely
• A set V of ‘hidden’ (or latent) variables, i.e., variables which are never explicitly presented to
the agent, but which are sufficient to determine the outcomes of all experiments.2 Each setup
s ∈ S can be equated with a vector specifying exactly one value for each of the variables in V,
and each experiment is assumed to test one and only one of the variables in V, although there
may be multiple experiments testing the same variable. For instance, if there are two variables
with two values each, then there will be four classes of setups corresponding to the four possible
configurations of the values of the variables in V, i.e s1 = 00, s2 = 01, s3 = 10, s4 = 11. There
will also be at least two experiments, each corresponding to one variable, where the outcome of
each experiment is determined by the value that the given setup entails for the corresponding
variable.
The problem of unobserved variables is also relevant to the field of machine learning (specif-
ically reinforcement learning), in the context of partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDPs, see, e.g., Poupart (2012)). In such processes, the input available to the agent does not
contain sufficient information to completely characterise the state of the environment, or to make
deterministic assessments of the consequences of possible actions. By contrast, in the scenario
considered here, the input (the setup s) does completely specify the state, in the sense that s
determines with certainty the outcomes of all possible experiments that could be performed on it.
What is unavailable to the agent are merely auxiliary variables that help structure the relations
between the various setups in S and the corresponding predictions.
2.2 Concrete scenario used in training agents
To illustrate these ideas, we now provide a concrete example of a learning environment containing
hidden variables. This scenario will also be used as the default case in our subsequent analysis of
the agents’ learning capabilities. It is illustrated visually in Fig. 1.
2We stress that that ‘hidden variable’ terminology is not intended to reflect the usage of the terminology in the
quantum foundations community. By ‘hidden variable’, we mean simply an environmental variable that is not directly
observable for the agent.
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Figure 1: A task environment with hidden variables and rules to be discovered: the agent receives
objects (top left) on which it can perform a range of experiments (top right), whose outcomes (bottom)
it attempts to predict. What is hidden from the agent (grey box) is that each object can be described
by a vector of values, namely its mass, charge and size, and each experiment can be predicted given
the value of one of these variables: when suspending the object from a spring (‘scale experiment’) or
hitting it to impart a given momentum (‘momentum experiment’), the outcome depends on the object’s
mass; when passing it near a compass or placing it near a test charge, the results depend on the object’s
charge, while the outcomes of grasping the object or submerging it in a bucket of water depend on its
size.
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In our default scenario, each setup consists of an object that the agent can experiment on,
which is characterised by |V| = 3 hidden variables: mass, size and electric charge. (Since objects
can in principle have different densities, mass and size are generally not correlated.) Each of these
properties predicts the outcomes of 2 different experiments: for example, electric charge predicts
what force the object will experience when placed next to a known test charge, and also how
much the object will deflect a compass needle when moving past it at a given speed and distance.
Mass predicts what will happen if an object is hit, imparting a fixed amount of momentum, or
if it is placed on a scale in a known gravitational field, and similarly an object’s size predicts its
behaviour in two other experiments. Overall, this environment admits |E| = 6 experiments that
the agent can perform. We assume that the possible values of each variable are coarse-grained into
3 distinct values; for example, the variable ‘electric charge’ can take the (coarse-grained) values
‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘neutral’ and the variable ‘size’ can take the values ‘big’, ‘small’ and
‘medium’. These values are reflected in corresponding outcomes for each experiment, so that the
number of predictions corresponding to each experiment is also3 3. This gives rise to a total of
|P| = 6 ·3 = 18 predictions that the agent can choose from, of which 6 will be correct for any given
object. The expected success rate for random guesses in this environment is therefore 1/3. Since
setups (objects) are identified with configurations of the values of the variables in V, it follows that
|S| = 27, i.e., there are 27 distinct objects on which the agent is able to experiment, and each of
those objects instantiates one of the 27 possible configurations of the values of the ‘charge’, ‘size’
and ‘mass’ variables.
The agent’s interaction with this environment proceeds as outlined above: the agent is presented
with a randomly chosen object, which is labelled simply with an integer between 1 and 27; the
agent then chooses an experiment, makes a corresponding prediction and finally receives a reward
if that prediction was correct for the given object. This process is iterated long enough for the
agent to eventually encounter all the available objects and learn about them. Specifically, the
agents whose results are analysed in the following are given T = 5 ∗ 106 rounds of interaction with
the environment in order to learn, in the default case.
In the standard reinforcement learning paradigm, the criterion for success in the kind of learning
task described here would be that the agent successfully learns how to make the correct predic-
tions for all object/experiment pairs. This is a purely operational criterion that can be straight-
forwardly accomplished in a reinforcement learning setting by implementing a learning dynamics
that increases an agent’s disposition to make particular predictions in proportion to the extent to
which those predictions have been rewarded in the past (and implementing some form of greed
avoidance). However, we have also introduced a second criterion for success, which is the central
aim of the present work: that the agent, beyond learning how to reliably predict the outcomes
for all object/experiment pairs, also comes to identify that there are three hidden variables that
determine which predictions will be correct for each object/experiment pair.
3Here we assume that whenever an experiment e tests a hidden variable V , each possible outcome of e (prediction for
e) corresponds to exactly one possible value of V . It is possible to relax this assumption, but it plays a useful simplifying
role in what follows.
6
2.3 The Value of Understanding
With this formal description of the environment in hand, it is worth pausing to reiterate a few of the
central motivations behind this second success criterion. Firstly, identifying the variables at play in
the agent’s deliberation is a crucial first step towards rendering the agent’s deliberations genuinely
transparent, interpretable and communicable. Secondly, there is a significant difference between
an agent that merely memorises which predictions were rewarded for which object/experiment
pairs and an agent that has identified that there exist significant unobserved variables – which we
might identify as ‘mass’, ‘size’ and ‘charge’ – and makes predictions on the basis of which value a
given variable takes for a given object. (For example, the agent predicts that the second object
will present a reading of ‘high’ in the scale experiment because it already knows that (i) there
exists a variable that predicts the outcome of the scale experiment (‘mass’) and (ii) that, based
on the momentum experiment, the object has high mass.) It is natural to say that the second
agent possesses a genuine understanding of its environment, in a sense which is absent for the first
agent.4 A similar sentiment is expressed by Bengio et al. (2013), who writes
An AI must fundamentally understand the world around us, and we argue that this can
only be achieved if it can learn to identify and disentangle the underlying explanatory
factors hidden in the observed milieu of low-level sensory data (Bengio et al. (2013):
1798)
Thirdly, many cognitive abilities are grounded in the ability to describe one’s environment
in terms of abstract conceptual representations. Saliently, the ability to generalise previously
acquired knowledge to deal with new experiences seems to be intimately connected to the ability to
represent significant properties of one’s environment in terms of abstract variables. (This intuitive
conjecture is empirically vindicated in section 5.3.) More generally, there are numerous pragmatic
and theoretical motivations for regarding the identification of abstract variables corresponding to
the environment’s hidden variables as a success criterion for explorative learning agents. In section
4, we will provide a concrete formalisation of this second success criterion for a particular kind
of reinforcement learning agent. First, we turn to specifying the precise cognitive architecture of
those agents.
3 The learning agent
We will work within the context of the projective simulation (PS) framework for artificial intel-
ligence agents, which was first proposed by Briegel and De las Cuevas (2012). This framework
aims to provide a concrete example of what it means to be a deliberating agent: entities that can
act on their environment, thereby generally changing its state, and, more importantly, that make
their own decisions in the sense that they are not pre-programmed to take particular actions under
given circumstances, but instead are flexible and develop their own action and response patterns.
While one of the achievements of the PS framework is to provide a concrete, explicit model of
agency, the agents’ ability to learn has been a point of considerable interest, having been tested
4This is closely related to the point that Block (1981) makes in his famous ‘Blockhead’ thought experiment, which is
intended to refute the Behaviourist conception of intelligence enshrined in the Turing test.
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against more utilitarian reinforcement learning algorithms on a number of benchmark problems
(see, e.g., Briegel and De las Cuevas (2012); Mautner et al. (2015); Melnikov et al. (2018a)).
The broad conceptual-mathematical basis also supports much more diverse applications, ranging
from the autonomous development of complex skills in robotics (Hangl et al., 2016, 2017) through
modelling of collective motion in animal swarms (Ried et al., 2019) to the control of quantum
systems (Tiersch et al., 2015; Wallno¨fer et al., 2019; Nautrup et al., 2018) and the design of new
experiments (Melnikov et al., 2018b).
The interaction of the agent with its environment is formalised following the general framework
of reinforcement learning (see, e.g., Sutton and Barto (1998)): the learner receives a percept that
encodes some information about the state of its environment, based on which it chooses an action,
and, if the action puts the environment in a state that satisfies some pre-defined success criterion,
the learner is given a reward. A classic example of reinforcement learning is the grid world task,
wherein the agent must navigate a maze: at each time-step, it perceives its current position, chooses
to take a step in some direction, and, if this brings it to a goal that is located somewhere in the
maze, receives a reward. This pattern of interactions fits in naturally with the structured learning
environment outlined in section 2, with percepts specifying the setup and actions being the choice
of a prediction. Only a small modification is required regarding rewards: if an agent is supposed
to discover patterns and hidden variables by making predictions about the world, it should not
rely on rewards provided by the environment, but instead be endowed with an internal mechanism
by which it essentially rewards itself if the prediction was correct. (The idea of a learning process
that does not primarily aim to achieve an externally supplied reward, but instead encourages a
learner to explore its environment simply for the sake of obtaining more information (although
that may turn out to be useful for reaching more external rewards in the future), was incorporated
from developmental psychology into reinforcement learning under the term intrinsically motivated
learning (Oudeyer et al., 2007; Barto, 2013). More specifically, intrisically motivated learning in
RL often refers to mechanisms that guide the learner towards situations that maximise the gain
of new information, which one might describe as curiosity. For the purpose of the present work,
however, it is sufficient to consider an agent that simply rewards itself whenever it makes a correct
prediction.)
Let us now turn to the internal mechanism by which agents decide on an action given a percept,
which is the defining feature for which projective simulation is named: PS agents simulate (or
project) conceivable developments that, based on past experience, could arise from the present
percept. Their simulation favours those sequences that have been rewarded in the past, so as
to arrive at an action that is also likely to carry a reward. In order to ensure the autonomy
and flexibility of the agent, the simulation is not based on some predefined representation of the
environment, but instead on episodic ‘snippets’ – termed clips – from the agent’s own experience,
which could represent percepts, actions or combinations thereof. The deliberation process consists
of a random walk over clip space, starting at the clip that represents the percept currently being
presented and terminating when an action clip is reached and the corresponding action realised.
A generic example of such a clip network is illustrated in Fig. 2.
In order to adapt its responses to an environment – that is, to learn – the agent must be able
to modify how the random walk over clip space proceeds. To this end, each edge from clip i to
clip j is given a (positive, real-valued) weight, termed the hopping value or h-value for short and
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Figure 2: A PS agent’s memory of its interaction with the environment is summarised in the episodic
and compositional memory (ECM): a network of clips of previous experience, including in particular
percepts (denoted si) and actions (ai). Deliberation is realised as a random walk over clip space,
starting at a percept and terminating at an action, with the probabilities of hopping from clip i to clip
j governed by the weights hij of the relevant edges. If a reward is received, the edges traversed to reach
that decision are strengthened.
denoted hij . These weights govern the probabilities with which the walk proceeds from clip i to
clip j:
P (j|i) = hij∑
k hik
, (1)
with all weights set initially to hij = 1. PS agents learn primarily by modifying the weights of
edges: if a deliberation process going from percept s to action a leads to a reward R, then all the
edges traversed as part of this deliberation are strengthened, i.e., their h-values are increased. In
general, this is balanced by forgetting, which decreases the weights of all edges by a factor 1 − γ,
driving them back to their initial weight of hij = 1, so as to gradually eliminate unused connections.
Combining these two mechanisms, the update rule for h-values reads
h
(t+1)
ij − 1 = (1− γ)
(
h
(t)
ij − 1
)
+
R(t) if used,0 if unused, (2)
where R(t) denotes the reward received at turn t.
The network of connected clips inside a PS agent is termed episodic and compositional memory
(ECM), based on two noteworthy properties: firstly, the sequence of clips that are excited during
a random walk can be understood as a simulation of an ordered sequence of events, or episode.
Secondly, the set of clips over which the walk proceeds is not static, but can be augmented by
creating new clips, either by composing existing ones or by adding blank clips that can come to
represent novel content. This second possibility, of additional clips that represent neither percepts
nor actions, but some other, a priori undefined semantics, will enable our agents to form novel
concepts. (While such clips can in principle be created dynamically, during the learning process, the
present work focuses on how existing clips can acquire relevant semantics, leaving the exploration
of clip creation to future work.)
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3.1 Enabling learning agents to handle more complex environ-
ments: connections to existing work
In the simplest agents, the ECM has just two layers, representing percepts and actions, with
connections proceeding simply from percepts to actions, and their strengths encoding which is the
preferred response to each input. Such a structure is shown in Fig. 3a. However, more complex
tasks can generally be solved better with more sophisticated structures. By way of illustration,
this section summarises a simple learning task that was previously posed to PS, and that resembles
the abstraction task of the present work, before discussing previously proposed modifications that
enable PS to handle this challenge.
The task of interest is the infinite colour game, introduced by Melnikov et al. (2017). In this
environment, the agent is shown a two-component percept, featuring an arrow that points in a
certain direction (left or right) and is painted in one of (countably) infinitely many colours. The
agent then has the choice of moving left or right (ostensibly to defend one of two doors against an
attacker) and is rewarded if it chose the correct action. The ‘hidden structure’ in this environment
is that the correct choice is telegraphed solely by the direction of the arrow, whereas the colour
information is irrelevant to the task. The challenge for the agent is to learn to disregard colour,
which would allow it to achieve perfect success in its responses even if it has never encountered a
particular percept (that is, that combination of direction and colour) before.
To solve this problem, Melnikov et al. (2017) introduced an architecture where the agent dy-
namically generates wildcard clips: additional clips that are added to the ECM between the layers
of percept and action clips, representing either only a direction without specifying a colour or only
a colour without specifying a direction (or, most generally, neither a colour nor a direction, i.e., a
completely uninformative clip). The structure is illustrated in Fig. 3b. Notably, the wildcard clips
are connected to the two-component percept clips according to a fixed rule, namely connecting
only to those percepts that contain the direction (resp. colour) in question. In order for such an
agent to be successful in a given environment, the environment must have two key properties: the
percept space must be formed by products of several components (or categories), which the agent
must be able to perceive as independent pieces of information, and the reward rule must be such
that disregarding a subset of these components is a useful strategy for determining the correct ac-
tions. By capitalising on these properties, wildcard PS performed significantly better than chance
on the infinite colour game. Here we want to abandon the assumption that the structure of the
relevant variables is known a priori and aim instead to construct an agent that is able to infer the
structure of the variables from its interactions with the environment.
Considering the above properties of the PS framework, we note that, while the architecture
of PS agents supports reinforcement learning (RL), it differs from conventional, more widely used
algorithms for RL or for machine learning in general in several important ways. Contrasting with
RL algorithms such as SARSA or Q-Learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which essentially tabulate
the expected rewards for each percept-action pair, the additional internal structure of PS agents
supports a more complex understanding of the environment. (In the case of environments that
do not require such complexity, such as the classic benchmark tasks ‘grid world’ and ‘mountain
car’, PS also achieves results that are at least comparable to conventional, tabular RL algorithms
(Melnikov et al., 2018a).)
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Figure 3: Various ECM structures connecting percept clips (top layer) to action clips (bottom layer):
(a) Two-layer is the simplest architecture. (b) Wildcard clips represent information about a subset of
components of the percept. (c) Three-layer architecture proposed here, with a layer of intermediate
clips that will come to represent values of hidden variables.
Another important and influential framework for machine learning employs artificial neural
networks (ANNs). These networks also possess several layers or more convoluted structures and
may, on first view, look quite similar to the ECM in Fig. 3c. However, the two structures function
along very different lines. For one, training ANNs (by backpropagation) requires the learner to
know what the outcome should have been (i.e., a supervised learning setting), whereas PS can
learn by trial and error, i.e., being informed only whether it made the correct choice. With
respect to the internal functioning, a single deliberative process in an ANN excites many neurons,
often at the same time, with information being encoded in the pattern of excitations, whereas
individual neurons typically carry no clear meaning. By contrast, in an ECM, exactly one clip is
excited at a time, and any single clip can carry all the information involved in the deliberative
process at that time (for example the entire percept or a complete specification of the action that
the agent is deciding to take). This difference in functioning and semantics becomes especially
relevant when one is concerned with interpretability: due to the delocalised way in which an ANN
represents information, it takes considerable effort to trace or explain how it reached the conclusion
it did (Alvarez-Melis and Jaakkola, 2018; Sellam et al., 2019; Biran and Cotton, 2017; Molnar, 2019;
Samek et al., 2017). PS, on the other hand, clearly reveals what path the deliberation took, passing
through particular intermediate clips that can – as we will see in the following – be endowed with
an objective interpretation in terms of hidden variables.
3.2 Specific architecture of our agents
As we stressed in the previous section, the ambition of the present work is not simply that the
agents learn to make correct predictions, but rather that they develop some internal representation
of the hidden variables that underlie such predictions. At first blush, there is no obvious way to
encode such representations in the simplest two-layer structure that is characteristic of the ECMs
of standard simple PS agents. So, in order to support such representations, we propose an agent
whose ECM consists of three layers: an initial layer of percept clips (with one clip to represent
each possible setup; in the default scenario, 27), a final layer of action clips (representing the
predictions for the various experiments, by default 18), and, between them, a layer of intermediate
clips (denoted I).
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We assume that these three layers are connected in a particular way, as illustrated in Fig. 3c.
(Note that the following specifies only which connections exist in the ECM. The weights of the
connections, on the other hand, which effectively guide the agent’s choices and which will serve as
a basis for identifying hidden variables, develop during the learning process.) In our agents, each
clip in one layer is connected to all the clips in the layer(s) immediately before and after, but not
to any clips in the same layer or in more distant ones. Moreover, all connections are directed from
percepts towards actions, so that the ECM is acyclic. Thus, every path from a percept clip to an
action clip passes through exactly one intermediate clip on the way, and for every percept-action
pair there is one path through each intermediate clip.
Regarding the number of intermediate clips, we require only that it be no greater than the
number of possible setups (percepts) the agent may encounter, and otherwise leave the number
of clips in I unconstrained. This requirement is related to the natural interpretation of the in-
termediate clips. Intuitively, the idea is that each intermediate clip denotes a possible label for
a given situation (percept/setup). When the agent encounters a setup s ∈ S, they first have to
choose a ‘label’ for that experience. This is formalised as the random walk through the agent’s
ECM transitioning from s to some i ∈ I. Based on the label i, the agent then chooses an action –
formally, by transitioning from the intermediate clip i to an action clip a.5 Note that such labels
may well be shared by various setups, but each meaningful label must be attached to at least one
setup. For this reason, there is no point having more labels than there are setups to assign them
to; hence the requirement that |S| ≥ |I|. In the present work, we consider agents whose number
of intermediate clips is equal to the number of hidden variables times the number of values that
each variable can take. Preliminary tests suggest that having fewer intermediate clips than that is
a significant obstacle to abstraction, whereas a larger number of clips leads to a slight reduction
in learning efficiency, but does not pose any fundamental problems. We intend to explore this in
more detail in future work.
An additional feature of our proposed agents is a ‘boredom’ mechanism, which addresses the
following problem: once an agent has made the connection from a particular setup s to one predic-
tion p, which pertains to a particular experiment e, the most effective way for the agent to continue
reaping rewards is to simply repeat prediction p every time it encounters setup s. However, we
want the agent to explore what would be the correct predictions for other experiments e′ as well.
(The dilemma of balancing between these two goals is well-known in machine learning, where it
is usually termed the ‘exploration vs exploitation’ tradeoff.) To favour exploration, the agent is
endowed with ‘boredom’: if, for a give setup s and a particular experiment e, the agent has come
to favour one of the predictions that pertain to e over the others with high probability, then exper-
iment e is deemed boring with this setup. Formally, for a given s, any prediction that pertains to
an experiment that is deemed ‘boring’ is rejected, with the deliberation process simply being reset
until it produces a prediction about a non-boring experiment. We note that this rejection and
resetting is an internal process applied by the agent itself. As far as the environment is concerned,
the agent eventually produces a single prediction, which is guaranteed to pertain to an experiment
that is not boring.
5For example, when looking at a traffic light an agent perceives a particular shade of green (determined by light and
viewing conditions etc). They then disregard the particularities of that shade and simply label the experience as ‘green’,
and then go on to choose an action (e.g., driving) on the basis of that label.
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In order to highlight the capabilities that this architecture affords, we will compare the three-
layer agents described so far against simpler two-layer agents, which lack an intermediate layer
(see Fig. 3a). We will show that three-layer agents develop patterns of connection weights that can
be interpreted as representing the environment’s hidden variables and perform significantly better
than chance on generalisation tests, whereas their two-layer counterparts are incapable of either of
these feats.
4 Variable Identification
In the standard environment described in section 2.2, the agent is presented with an integer index
specifying one of 27 possible setups, before subsequently choosing one of 18 available predictions
(each of which pertains to one of 6 available experiments). The random walk leading to that decision
consists of two steps: firstly, from the appropriate percept clip to one intermediate clip (which serves
to ‘label’ the given setup), and then onwards to an action clip representing a prediction. If the
prediction is correct, then both of the connections traversed in the random walk will be strengthened
in proportion to the agent’s reward. Once this process has been iterated often enough, the agent
should have learned both (i) to label each of the percepts s with intermediate clips in I, in the
sense that the connections from s to one or several particular i are much stronger than to the
others, and (ii) to choose correct outcome predictions for various experiments on the basis of those
labels, in the sense that the connections from i to some actions are much stronger than they are
to others.
Both of these sets of connections - from percepts to intermediate clips (representing assignments
of labels to setups) and from intermediate clips to actions (encoding which labels are relevant to
which experiments) - reflect patterns that the agent has learned in order to make sense of its
environment. The present section provides a conceptual discussion of how certain properties and
structures in the pattern of weights of these connections can be used to identify the abstract
conceptual representations at play in the agent’s deliberations.
4.1 Variable identification based on connections from percepts to
intermediate clips
Before describing how we can identify the agent’s abstract representations of the environment’s
hidden variables based on the weights of the connections in its ECM, it will be useful to specify more
precisely what is meant by a ‘variable’ in this context. Formally, a variable can be characterised
as an abstract property such that every setup instantiates one and only one value of that property.
This definition is trivially satisfied by the hidden variables ‘mass’, ‘size’ and ‘charge’ in our running
example. Importantly, this definition also implies that, for every variable, the set of values is jointly
exhaustive and mutually exclusive with respect to setups, i.e., every setup maps to at least one
value of a given variable, and no setup maps to more than one value of a given variable.
We can now detail what role such variables play in an agent’s deliberation on a learning task.
The most natural description is that the agent’s deliberations about which prediction to make go by
way of labelling the presented setup with a value of the relevant variable. To illustrate: the variable
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‘size’ plays a role in the agent’s deliberations if and only if, in deciding which prediction to make for
a given setup, they label the setup with a particular value for the ‘size’ variable (e.g., ‘big’, ‘small’,
‘medium’) and then choose the prediction on the basis of that label. This explication suggests that,
when trying to identify the variables represented in the agent’s deliberative structures, we should
expect each value of a variable to be represented by a label for setups, i.e., by an intermediate
clip in I. Accordingly, a whole variable should be represented by a subset of intermediate clips,
denoted I˜, whose elements represent the various values of the given variable. Moreover, the sets
representing different variables should be ‘mutually exclusive’ and ‘jointly exhaustive’ in the sense
that for any setup s, the agent is disposed to label s by exactly one of the labels in the set. Roughly,
this means that each percept connects ‘strongly’ to exactly one of the labels in the set, and ‘weakly’
to all the other labels in the set. If two setups s1 and s2 both link strongly to different labels in the
set representing a variable, that means that the setups have different values for that variable. If
they link to the same label, they are perceived as sharing the same value for the variable. The top
half of Fig. 4 illustrates the kind of pattern in the ECM that allows us to identify representations
of variables via the semantics described above.
In sum, then, the idea is this: in order to identify the abstract variables that are represented in
the agent’s deliberative structures, we should attempt to identify the subsets of intermediate clips
in the agent’s ECM that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive with respect to setups. The
functional role that these subsets play in the deliberations of a PS agent renders them susceptible
to legitimate interpretation as internal representations of abstract variables.
Having specified a criterion for identifying the variables at play in our agents’ deliberations, we
can now describe what it would look like for the agents to satisfy the central success criterion we
put forward for the learning task described in section 2.1: namely, that the agents form internal
representations of the environment’s hidden variables, i.e., ‘mass’, ‘size’ and ‘charge’. Following
the procedure described above, we would identify these representations with subsets of labels
(intermediate clips in I) that are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive with respect to setups.
Specifically, we would expect each of the three variables to be represented by a separate (pairwise
disjoint6) set of three intermediate clips (since each coarse-grained hidden variable has only three
values) such that each of the 27 available setups is strongly connected to exactly one clip in each
set. (One can verify that, for any clip in any set, there should therefore be 9 setups that map
strongly to that clip, since for each value of charge/mass/size, there are 9 objects which have that
value.) In the event that the agent forms a structure of this form in their ECM, we will be able to
legitimately identify representations of the environment’s three hidden variables in their internal
deliberative structures.
At this stage, it is worth pausing to reiterate a few important clarifications. Firstly, we stress
that, in general (and in the specific example considered here), we assume that, for each hidden vari-
able, there are several experiments whose outcomes are determined by the value that that variable
takes for the given setup. If there were only one such experiment for a particular hidden variable,
then the conceptual distinction between the hidden variable and the experiment that reveals it
would be lost, and the intermediate clips would no longer represent abstractions, but would simply
6We expect these sets of intermediate clips to be pairwise disjoint because knowing, for a given setup, that a variable
V0 takes a value v0 or that a variable V1 takes a value v1 are two independent pieces of information, or labels, that can
be assigned to the setup.
14
Figure 4: (top) Structure of connections in the ideal ECM. For clarity, only connections from two per-
cepts are shown, and all weak connections are suppressed. (bottom) Matrix representations of the ideal
connections (left) and, for comparison, the corresponding connections formed by a real agent (right),
showing separately connections from percepts to intermediate clips (top row) and from intermediate
clips to experiment-predictions (bottom row). In order to showcase the characteristic structure of those
connections, the intermediate clips are ordered according to the values they represent, as V0 = 0, V0 = 1,
V0 = 2, V1 = 0, V1 = 1, V1 = 2, V2 = 0, V2 = 1, V2 = 2. In the case of h-matrices learned by a real
agent, the intermediate clips generally represent a random permutation of these values. However, they
can be sorted in the same way by inferring the correct ordering based on an analysis of the connections,
as detailed in section 5.
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act as copies of the outcomes associated with the values of the hidden variables. The interpretation
of intermediate clips as internal representations of the values of hidden variables is only principled
and legitimate when the environment structure is rich enough to support abstraction, which in this
case means that hidden variables are tested by multiple experiments.
Secondly, we stress that, while the outcome of an experiment M (‘What happens when I hold
the object next to a known magnet?’) can be predicted by knowing the value of a hidden variable
µ (‘Is it magnetic?’), the two are conceptually very different objects. Crucially, the experiment M
is part of the agent’s repertoire of actions, whereas µ is a hidden variable, i.e., a property of the
environment that is in principle inaccessible to the agent, and whose existence and role the agent
can only infer from patterns in the way setups connect to (correct) predictions.
4.2 Variable identification based on connections from labels to
experiment-predictions
We turn now to presenting a second, alternative method of identifying the variables at play in the
deliberations of our PS agents. We will see in section 5 that the two methods produce largely
identical results.
If, as above, one wants to group the intermediate clips/labels into subsets such that each set
represents the different values of a single variable, one could also simply pick one experiment and
map backwards to the labels that predict its various outcomes. The resulting set of labels is
then naturally interpreted as representing the variable tested by the given experiment. Ideally,
there should be exactly one such label for each prediction, since we have assumed that each of
the predictions associated with a given experiment correspond to values of the variable tested by
that experiment. Moreover, if there exist experiments e1, e2 whose outcomes are predicted by the
same variable, then one expects the sets of labels obtained in this manner to coincide. This allows
one to verify that e1 and e2 are predicted by the same variable and, moreover, to identify which
prediction of e1 corresponds to the same value of the hidden variable as a particular prediction
7
for e2. On the other hand, if two experiments e1 and e3 are predicted by different variables, then
one should expect that any label that is strongly connected to a prediction of e1 is not strongly
connected to any prediction pertaining to e3. The expected pattern of connections is illustrated in
the bottom half of Fig. 4.
In sum, the idea is that one can identify the different values of a single variable by identifying
those labels that lead to all the different predictions of a single experiment. If there are two
experiments whose various predictions are reached from the same set of labels, then these should
be interpreted as being predicted by the same variable, whereas disjoint sets of labels herald
experiments that reveal different variables.
7In general, it may be that e1 and e2 reveal different coarse-grainings of a single variable, so that some pair of values of
that variable lead to the same prediction in e1 but different predictions in e2, while another pair of values is distinguished
only by e1 but not by e2. In this case, one cannot identify labels and predictions for both experiments one-to-one.
However, and more importantly, it still holds that a single set of labels connect strongly to all the predictions of e1
and e2, therefore still supporting the inference that these labels collectively represent a single variable that predicts the
outcomes of both experiments. We have deliberately excluded such differently coarse-grained experiments in the scenario
considered here in order to focus on more essential questions.
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Again, we can illustrate this second prospective semantics for identifying representations of
hidden variables in the agent’s ECM by considering the example presented in section 2.2. As
before, the aim is that the agent form internal representations of the coarse-grained variables we
interpret as ‘mass’, ‘size’ and ‘charge’. The new procedure for identifying these representations
works as follows. For each experiment, we check whether there is a set of intermediate clips such
that every clip in the set connects strongly to a different possible prediction for that experiment. For
example, in the experiment in which the given object is placed on a scale, we check whether there
exists a set I˜ ⊆ I such that each i ∈ I˜ connects strongly to one of the three possible predictions for
the experiment (‘high reading’, ‘low reading’, ‘medium reading’). If such a I˜ exists, then we can
interpret I˜ as the agent’s internal representation of a variable that predicts the outcome of that
experiment. Moreover, we expect it to be that (i) each of the clips in I˜ also connect strongly to
exactly one prediction of the other mass experiment, and (ii) none of the clips in I˜ connect strongly
to any of the predictions associated with any of the size or charge experiments. This fact allows
the agent to deduce that there exists a single variable that predicts the outcomes of both the ‘scale’
and the ‘momentum’ experiment, but not the others. We, human scientists, might subsequently
identify this variable as ‘mass’, but the essential inference that there exists such a variable can be
made by the agent itself.
Finally, let us preempt a potential criticism that one might raise against this second procedure
for identifying representations of variables in the agents’ ECM. Specifically, one might argue that
by assuming that the agent knows that the number of values of each variable should correspond
to the number of outcomes of some available experiment, we are essentially giving them a-priori
knowledge about the hidden structure of their environment, and thereby trivialising the discovery
task. However, we hold that, firstly, the agent can make the non-trivial inference that there exists
an unobserved variable whose value predicts the outcomes of one or more experiments. Moreover,
the agent learns to distinguish between several coarse-grained intervals of values that this variable
can take that map to different predictions in the experiments. The semantics we are proposing
makes no ontological claims about the values that the unobserved variable itself takes, but simply
points out that there exist patterns in the environment that can be explained in terms of hidden
variables. This is the essential insight that the agent distills, and it does not depend on any a-priori
assumptions about the number of values this variable might take.
5 Results
The first result of our simulations is that our three-layer agents learn to successfully predict the
outcomes of setup-experiment pairs with success probabilities of at least 90%. One can compare
how quickly the three-layer agent proposed here learns compared to a basic two-layer agent that
simply tabulates the correct prediction for each percept-experiment pair. As shown in Fig. 5,
two-layer agents learn much more quickly.
It should not come as a surprise that, in standard reinforcement learning tasks, three-layer
agents are much slower when it comes to learning how to maximise rewards, since the extra
clip-layer significantly complicates their deliberations and interferes with their memorisation of
previous rewards. However, given that we are interested in engineering agents which are capable
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Figure 5: Comparison of the reward rate as a function of time achieved by simple two-layer agents,
which are incapable of abstraction, and three-layer agents, which are capable of abstraction. Note the
different time-scales required to achieve rewards around 90%: two-layer agents were trained for only
104 rounds of interaction, while three-layer agents were given T = 5 ∗ 106.
not just of maximising rewards, but also of forming interpretable conceptual representations of
their environment, we do not take this to constitute a major problem. It is utopian to expect that
one could satisfy the second of these success criteria without sacrificing something in the way of
learning speed. But while they incur operational disadvantages regarding learning speed, we will
see that three-layer agents accrue some major operational advantages pertaining to their ability to
solve generalisation problems (see section 5.3).
While establishing that agents learn how to make correct predictions and maximise rewards
is important, the main point we want to make in this section is that agents with the three-layer
ECM structure outlined above do indeed develop identifiable abstract representations of the en-
vironment’s hidden variables, i.e., they satisfy the central success criterion of the present work.
To justify this claim, the following subsections detail firstly an analysis of the connections that
the agent establishes between percepts and intermediate clips and how those represent abstrac-
tions and allow us to identify which subsets of intermediate clips represent variables, followed by
an analogous analysis based on the connections from intermediate clips to actions (predictions).
Finally, section 5.3 turns to the problem of generalisation and demonstrates that, while two-layer
agents are constitutionally incapable of solving the task (or of forming meaningful abstractions),
our three-layer agents achieve a significantly better performance.
5.1 Verifying abstraction and identifying variables based on con-
nections between percepts and intermediate clips
One way of analysing what the agent has learned is based on the conceptual considerations laid
out in section 4.1. We formalise the requirements of exhaustivity and exclusivity as follows: given
a subset of intermediate clips I˜ ⊆ I that might represent (the set of values of) a hidden variable,
we define functions exh(I˜) and excl(I˜) that assign to I˜ one real-valued indicator each, quantifying
how well it satisfies exhaustivity and exclusivity, respectively. Intuitively, high values of exh(I˜) and
excl(I˜) indicate that the elements of I˜ plausibly represent the values of a single variable identified
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by the agent.
Exhaustivity demands that each percept s be strongly connected to (at least) one clip in I˜.
The condition is therefore violated, for a given s, if the probability of reaching any clip in I˜
– technically, we take maxi∈I˜ P (i|s) – is much smaller than the probability of going to a clip
outside the subset, which we quantify8 by maxi∈I\I˜ P (i|s). As a measure of exhaustivity, we take
a (weighted, logarithmic) average of the ratio of these probabilities over all percepts,
exh(I˜) :=
∑
s
ws log
maxi∈I˜ P (i|s)
max
i∈I\I˜
P (i|s)
 , (3)
where ws is a vector of weights
9. In an ideal agent and for subsets I˜ that actually represent a
hidden variable, this measure is zero. Larger values can occur if the agent is more likely to go to
clips inside I˜ than to any clips outside it, but, more importantly, values < 0 herald a violation of
exhaustivity.
Exclusivity demands that each percept s map strongly to no more than one intermediate clip
in I˜. The condition is therefore violated, for a given s, if the second-largest probability of reaching
a clip in I˜ is comparable to the largest one. As a measure of exclusivity, we take the (weighted,
logarithmic) average of the ratio of these probabilities over all percepts,
excl(I˜) :=
∑
s
ws log
 maxi∈I˜ P (i|s)
sec max
i∈I˜
P (i|s)
 , (4)
with the same weights ws as above. In an ideal agent and for subsets I˜ that actually represent a
hidden variable, this measure tends to plus infinity, whereas values close to 1 herald a violation of
exclusivity. (The measure is non-negative by design.)
Any subset I˜ that is close to representing (the values of) a hidden variable must have large
values of both exhaustivity and exclusivity. To check which I˜ satisfy this condition, we plot the
two measures for all subsets of the set of intermediate clips in Fig. 6. Based on this analysis, one
can identify a few ‘good’ subsets; for example, in the particular agent analysed here, intermediate
clips [3,4,8] are likely to represent one variable, while [2,6,7] are likely to represent another variable.
In addition to identifying particular subsets of intermediate clips, this analysis also reveals,
for example, how many hidden intermediate clips are necessary to represent a hidden variable
exhaustively (given by the cardinality of the ‘good’ subsets). For an ensemble of 20 agents in the
standard setting described in section 2.2, we obtain a value of 3.03±0.19, clearly revealing that the
environment, in fact, contains hidden variables that take 3 distinct values each. A similar analysis
can be performed based on the second layer of connections, as will be discussed in the following
section. Fig. 8 summarizes the results of this analysis and demonstrates how they allow one to read
off essential parameters of the environment (in particular the number of values that the hidden
variables can take) by tracking how the results change across different environments.
8In the case of the full set, I˜ = I, this probability is zero.
9For the data presented here, the weights ws for a given intermediate clip i are determined as follows: the percepts s
are sorted according to the values P (i|s) and indexed with integers inds = 0, 1, 2, ...S − 1 such that smaller P (i|s) carry
larger indices. Then ws = (inds/(S − 1))3/N , normalised to unit sum by choosing N =
∑
s(inds/(S − 1))3. This assigns
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Figure 6: Measures of exclusivity and exhaustivity for all subsets of intermediate clips, for the agent
specified in section 3.2 , with different symbols indicating the cardinality of the subset. Note how large
subsets achieve comparatively high exhaustivity, but at the cost of violating exclusivity, whereas subsets
of small cardinality have low exhaustivity but high exclusivity. Some of the subsets that achieve the
highest values for both measures simultaneously are specified explicitly.
5.2 Verifying abstraction and identifying variables based on con-
nections between intermediate and action clips
The procedure for analysing the connections from intermediate to action clips is summarised in
in Fig. 7. One begins by quantifying how strongly each intermediate clip predicts the outcomes
of each experiment, which allows one to group experiments whose outcomes are predicted by the
same subsets of intermediate clips together. Each such group is considered to stem from one
hidden variable. Working backwards, one can then identify which intermediate clips represent
values of each variable. This analysis reveals how many hidden variables are necessary to predict
the outcomes of all experiments in question, and moreover how many - and, in fact, which -
experiments are predicted by each of those variables. As for the intermediate clips, one can identify
which intermediate clips represent the various values of each of those variables.
For example, for the individual agent analysed here, the analysis identifies experiments 0 and 1
as being predicted by one variable, whose values are best represented by intermediate clips [2,6,7];
similarly 2 and 3 are predicted by a hidden variable whose values are represented by intermediate
clips [0,1,5], and experiments 4 and 5 are predicted by intermediate clips [3,4,8]. Let us compare
this conclusion with the analysis based on the connections from percepts to intermediate clips,
shown in Fig. 6: notably, while set set [0,1,5] was not highlighted in Fig. 6, the two subsets that
are identified most clearly in Fig. 6, [2,6,7] and [3,4,8], are the same ones found in the present
higher weights (up to 1/N) to those percepts that have small transition probabilities, effectively highlighting possible
violations of the exhaustivity condition.
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Figure 7: Identifying variables based on the connections from intermediate to action clips. (a) Tran-
sition probabilities from intermediate clips to predictions for each experiment e. These allow one to
compute with how much certainty (quantified by the neg-entropy) each intermediate clip predicts the
outcome of each experiment. (b) In a table of how well each intermediate clip predicts the outcomes of
each experiment, comparing two columns (the ‘predictability profiles’) of two experiments allows one
to judge how likely they are to involve the same variable. (c) The table of ‘predictability correlations’
between experiments has a striking block-diagonal structure, clearly showing that experiments 0 and 1
are predicted by one variable, 2 and 3 by another and 4 and 5 by a third. (Note that the suggestive
ordering of pairs of correlated experiments in panel c is due to the way the environment was coded
in our simulations. However, the high contrast of the correlation matrix allows one to identify related
experiments in generic environments that do not have this ordering just as well. Note also that the
correlation matrix is symmetric under transposition by construction, since the measure of correlation is
independent of the order of the experiments being compared.) Working backwards, one can identify in
panel (b) that, for example, experiments 4 and 5 are predicted most prominently by intermediate clips
[3,4,8], and one can further verify in panel (a) that those intermediate clips represent different values
of the underlying variable, since they lead to mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive predictions for
the experiments in question.
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analysis.
Regarding parameters of the environment, for an ensemble of 20 agents in the standard setting
described in section 2.2, we obtain the following measures:
• number of hidden variables (distinct classes of correlated experiments): 3.00± 0.32
• number of experiments predicted by each variable (number of experiments with which each
experiment correlates strongly): 2.05± 0.30
• number of values each variable can take (cardinality of the sets of intermediate variables
identified): 2.73± 0.29
• number of distinct intermediate clips identified as best representatives of values of hidden
variables: 7.65± 0.57 (this should be num features*num values)
Fig. 8 shows how these measures change across environments with different numbers of hidden
variables, of values and of experiments per variable.
5.3 Generalisation
To illustrate that the agent can, in fact, reap operational benefits from this construction, consider
a problem where an agent only trains with a subset of objects and experiments, leaving out one
object-experiment pair, but is then tested on the pair that it has never encountered. (In order to
allow repeated testing at different stages of the learning process, these agents never receive feedback
on the ‘test’ task.) Fig. 9 illustrates how two-layer agents can only guess at random in that case,
whereas an ensemble of our three-layer agents achieve significantly higher reward rates (on the
validation test), of (69 ± 25)%. This provides a concrete empirical vindication of the conjecture
that the cognitive faculties of abstraction and generalisation are intimately related.
6 Discussion
Before concluding, we pause to discuss and reiterate some of the major implications of the preceding
results and analysis.
6.1 On the Legitimacy of the Prospective ‘Concepts’
In sections 4 and 5, we presented an operational semantics for identifying the conceptual rep-
resentations at play in the deliberations of PS agents, before empirically illustrating how these
representations are formed and identified in concrete learning tasks. At this stage, one might be
inclined to dispute the extent to which the identified representations are truly indicative of underly-
ing conceptual thought. While we acknowledge that the defining characteristics of true conceptual
thought are a topic of substantial ongoing philosophical debate and greatly exceed the ambit of
the present work, it is worth highlighting that the semantics for concept identification presented
here chimes well with mainstream philosophical views about the nature of conceptual thought.
Specifically, there is an influential view according to which the defining hallmark of conceptual
thought is compositionality. On this view, an agent can only be said to truly possess a concept if
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Figure 8: Identifying properties of the environment based on an analysis of the connections between
percepts, intermediate clips and actions established by the agent (h-matrix): (a) One can read off the
number of hidden variables |V| by determining the number of disjoint blocks in the correlation matrix
depicted in Fig. 7c, or, indirectly, from the number of intermediate clips identified as representing
values of variables (which should be |V| ∗ |O|) or from the number of non-trivial correlations between
experiments (which should be |V|∗|E|(|E|−1)/2).(b) One can read off the number of values each hidden
variable can take from the cardinality of the sets of intermediate clips identified as representing single
variables (based on either the connections to percepts (1) or the connections to actions (2)), or, indirectly,
from the number of intermediate clips identified as representing values of variables (which should be
|V|∗|O|). (c) One can read off the number of experiments whose outcomes are predicted by each hidden
variable by determining directly how many experiments are strongly correlated in the matrix depicted
in Fig. 7c, or, indirectly, from the number of non-trivial correlations between experiments (which should
be |V| ∗ |E|(|E| − 1)/2). Note that agents in different environments were trained for different durations
T (measured in interaction rounds), with the training times for each environment chosen such that the
agents’ h-matrices settled into a clear pattern, as shown by the fact that the various measures used for
analysing the abstractions formed by the agent no longer changed noticeably. Specifically, agents in the
default scenario ((|V|, |E˜ |, |O|) = (3, 2, 3)) were trained for T = 5∗106 time-steps, whereas environments
with different values used (a) (|V| = 2, T = 5 ∗ 105), (|V| = 4, T = 5 ∗ 107), (|V| = 5, T = 108), (b)
(|E˜ | = 1, T = 5 ∗ 105), (|E˜ | = 3, T = 5 ∗ 106), (|E˜ | = 4, T = 5 ∗ 106), and (c) (|O| = 2, T = 5 ∗ 105),
(|O| = 4, T = 107).
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Figure 9: Performance on generalisation task over the course of training: (a) two-layer agents never go
beyond chance level (1/number of possible outcomes, i.e., 1/3), whereas (b) three-layer agents achieve
significantly higher success probability; in fact on par with their success rate at the percept-experiment
pairs for which they did receive feedback.
they are able to use it in a completely general way that is not restricted to any particular cognitive
context. For example, an agent could not truly be said to posses the concept ‘red’ if the only
thought in which they are able to use the concept is ‘big red car’. In order to qualify as truly
possessing the concept, the agent should be able to separate it from that one thought and use it
to construct new thoughts like ‘small red van’ or ‘sparkly red necklace’. This idea was formally
codified in Evans’ (1982) so called ‘generality constraint’, which posits that in order to qualify as
engaging in genuine conceptual thought, an agent must be capable of entertaining all syntactically
permissible combinations of the concepts they purportedly posses. So if the agent purportedly
possesses the concepts ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘heavy’, ‘van’, ‘house’ and ‘guitar’, they should be able to
form the thoughts ‘red van’, ‘red house’, ‘red guitar’, ‘blue van’, ‘blue house’, ‘blue guitar’, ‘heavy
van’, ‘heavy house’ and ‘heavy guitar’ (but not, e.g., ‘red blue’ or ‘house guitar’, which are not
syntactically permissible). Variations of this generality constraint have been used to evaluate the
prospective possession of genuine concepts by various animals. For example, Carruthers (2009)
argues that the Australian digger wasp, which uses its body to measure the length of the sand
towers it constructs, does not employ the concept of ‘length’ in a sufficiently compositional manner
to warrant ascribing possession of the concept to it.
At this stage, it is pertinent to ask whether our ascription of concepts representing hidden
variables to PS agents is consistent with Evans’ generality constraint or the requirement of com-
positionality more generally. Happily, it seems that the answer to this question is at least partially
positive. To see this, recall that on our semantics, one of the central criteria for a set of labels
to represent a variable is that they be jointly exhaustive with respect to setups. This means that
for every object that the agent is capable of representing, they are strongly disposed to label that
object with one of the values of the relevant variable. This in turn implies that each value of the
identified variable will connect strongly to multiple objects. If we identify concepts with values
of variables,10 then this means that the concepts formed by the agent are always applicable to
multiple objects and therefore exhibit at least a moderate degree of compositionality. Although
10So that the concept ‘red’ corresponds to one possible value of the colour variable, for example.
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this is not enough to guarantee full accordance with Evans’ generality constraint, which demands
complete and unrestricted compositionality, it is similar to the kind of partial compositionality
that authors like Carruthers (2009) argue is sufficient for genuine conceptual thought.
6.2 From Abstraction to Generalisation
The majority of our discussion so far has focused on abstraction, i.e., the capacity to form abstract
conceptual representations of salient features of one’s environment. A closely related (but impor-
tantly distinct) phenomenon is generalisation, meaning the capacity to utilise the knowledge that
one has acquired through previous experiences to deal efficiently with new experiences that differ
from everything one has previously encountered. It is natural to conjecture that an agent’s ability
to solve generalisation problems is closely related to their ability to solve abstraction problems.
One of the major payoffs of the present analysis is that we are able to provide a concrete empirical
vindication of this conjecture, by showing that agents that form identifiable variable representa-
tions (in the sense described above) are better able to solve generalisation tasks than agents that
lack the cognitive capacity to form these representations (see section 5.3).
We also noted that this power comes at a cost, with simple two-layer agents reaching high
rates of correct predictions much more quickly than the more sophisticated three-layer agents (see
Fig. 5). In an environment where memorisation of percept-action pairs is a viable strategy, it
may therefore be most efficient to employ a two-layer agent, which does not waste time looking
for hidden variables. However, as one proceeds to larger, more complex environments, where the
agent will more frequently encounter percepts it has not seen before, the ability to generalise (in
particular by forming abstractions) becomes increasingly advantageous.
The task of facilitating meaningful generalisation in PS agents has been the focus of previous
work, most notably by Melnikov et al. (2017). The generalisation capabilities exhibited by the
agents considered in section 5.3 go significantly beyond anything in this existing literature. Most
importantly, our agents are able to successfully abstract and generalise in a way that does not
rely on equipping them with a-priori knowledge regarding the structure of the environment. In
contrast, the generalisation mechanisms described by Melnikov et al. rely on learning rules which
implicitly encode a priori knowledge regarding the way in which the percept space can be coded
by values of the environment’s hidden variables. In our framework, the agent discovers this hidden
variable structure for themselves, and the very act of doing so facilitates their ability to generalise.
No extra learning rule is required.
It is also instructive here to consider the relationship between abstraction and generalisation
in the context of neural network architectures, which are of course remarkably successful in a wide
array of practical generalisation problems that involve generalising the patterns encountered in the
training set to deal with novel data in the test set. Typically, the networks are able to achieve
this generalisation capability without developing any easily identifiable representations of abstract
concepts. This suggests that, while abstraction can be a helpful basis for generalisation, as we have
argued in the present work, it is not a necessary pre-requisite. On the other hand, the ability of
artificial neural networks to generalise from their training examples to test instances has recently
been cast into doubt, with the appearance of striking results of adversarial approaches: notably,
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2015) proposed an algorithm that systematically fools deep neural networks
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into misclassifying images by manipulating just a few pixels. Such results cast serious doubt on
the reliability of broad and deep neural networks and highlight the importance of transparency in
building more robust ML solutions.
In this context, it is worth discussing the work of Iten et al. (2018), who trained neural networks
in such a way that they managed to ‘extract simple physical concepts from experimental data’.
A fundamental component of this process is an autoencoder, which is trained to compress input
data (such as time-series data from a damped pendulum) through a bottleneck of just a few so-
called latent neurons before attempting to reconstruct the original input. By testing how well
the network can later reconstruct the given data or make predictions based on it, given a varying
number of neurons in this bottleneck, one can infer how many real parameters are needed to specify
a particular instance from among the family of inputs on which the autoencoder was trained. For
example, if one is drawing from a family of time-series data for damped pendula, the parameters
that specify one instance are the frequency, damping parameter, initial phase and amplitude. The
values that these parameters take can be recovered from the excitations of the latent neurons in
the autoencoder.
An obvious difference between Iten et al. (2018) and the present work is the implementation that
supports the learning process (artificial neural networks in one case, projective simulation in the
other). However, a more interesting point for the present discussion are the conceptual differences
regarding what is learned in each case, rather than how. One fundamental difference is that
we consider agents that explore their environment by interacting with it and, accordingly, adopt
the paradigm of reinforcement learning. By contrast, continuing with the example of damped
oscillators, Iten et al. consider an algorithm that is fed pre-recorded data - one might imagine
being given a notebook with observations made in a laboratory, but no opportunity to go to the
lab and experiment oneself. While learning from pre-recorded data is a powerful paradigm that
has achieved great success for certain classes of problems, it requires the implicit assumption that
there was already some entity that gathered the data, and, more fundamentally, that identified
relevant variables whose values should be recorded for subsequent analysis.
It is this pre-requisite for data-based learning that our agents address: they start from a
setting where it is not known how a stream of complex sensory input should be decomposed into
independent, meaningful variables. This problem is not as far-fetched as one might think: in the
early development of various theories, for example quantum mechanics and electromagnetism, it
was a point of considerable debate which variables or concepts might be useful in talking about the
subject, and progress was only made by experimentation - that is, by interacting with the systems
under study. In our formal framework, this absence of pre-existing variables is reflected in the fact
that we consider percepts as being labelled by unique, atomic indices rather than vectors consisting
of well-defined components. Our agents take the first basic step of classifying these percepts by
ascribing to them operationally meaningful labels, which, crucially, have a particular structure,
with groups of labels forming a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive classification of percepts.
We argue that this property of a set of labels is the defining feature that allows one to interpret
them as representing values of some unobserved variable. In this sense, our agents can discover
the existence of hidden environmental variables.
The question of how one might infer the values of such variables from the available perceptual
data is a second, distinct step in learning about the environment. Our agents, facing an environment
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that is less challenging in this regard, can essentially memorise the value of each variable for each
percept. Iten et al. offer a more sophisticated approach to this part of the problem, implicitly
modelling the relation between the new-found variables by learning to compress families of curves
relating their values. However, we note that such compression can only be successful if one ensures
that all curves are drawn from the same family (for example, recording the position over time for
damped oscillators). In order to ensure that each data-set instantiates the relation between the
same pair (or set) of variables and that other relevant circumstances are kept constant throughout,
one must once again first identify the relevant variables for the system under study.
It is the ability to perform this first, more fundamental step, of autonomously discovering that
unstructured, atomic percepts admit a decomposition into meaningful variables, that is missing
in the aforementioned examples using neural networks. It seems plausible that this ability might
support a more robust performance, in particular with regards to generalisation.
6.3 Transparency, Explanation and Abstraction
As well as allowing PS agents to accrue significant new operational capacities in generalisation
tasks, the ability to form abstract conceptual representations also promises a number of other
advantages. One of the most salient advantages relates to the problem of rendering the deliberations
and decisions of PS agents fully communicable, explicable and transparent, a problem that becomes
urgent whenever artificial intelligence is put to practical use in human society.
To see this, note first that the present work takes the first steps towards constructing an explicit
symbolic interface through which PS agents can naturally articulate and communicate explanations
of their reasoning processes and decisions. For example, once the semantics has been employed
to identify the variables corresponding to ‘mass’, ‘size’ and ‘charge’ in the agent’s deliberations, it
would be straightforward to implement an automatic explanation generator that provided explicit
linguistic explanations of all the agent’s actions, e.g., ‘I predicted that the scale reading would
be high because object 2 is heavy’. Although the exact definition of agent transparency is still a
matter of significant controversy in the current literature (see, e.g., Chen et al. (2014); Lyons and
Havig (2014)), it seems clear that the ability to automatically construct explicit explanations of an
agent’s actions and deliberations constitutes a major step towards ‘transparency’ on all plausible
interpretations of the term. For example, Chen et al. define agent transparency as ‘the quality of
an interface (e.g., visual, linguistic) pertaining to its abilities to afford...comprehension about an
intelligent agent’s intent, performance, future plans, and reasoning process’. It is obvious that the
present work makes significant strides towards bringing PS agents in line with this criterion.
7 Future Work and Conclusion
Finally, we conclude by highlighting promising avenues to be explored in future work.
The first avenue relates to one of the most distinctive and crucial cognitive capacities of hu-
man reasoners, namely the ability to identify and exploit correlations between variables in their
environment. Here we have addressed one fundamental pre-requisite towards endowing PS agents
with this ability by enabling them to identify variables that describe significant features of their
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environment. The next step is to construct a representation and learning rule that allows the agent
to identify correlations between the different variables encoded in the ECM. We conjecture that
doing so will allow us to further enhance the agents’ generalisation abilities. To see why, imagine
that the agent is confronted with a setup s such that (i) they are already strongly disposed to
label s with a value v of some variable V that is tested by an experiment e, and (ii) they are not
strongly disposed to label s with any particular value of any variable V ∗ that predicts an exper-
iment e∗. In this case, the agent will already be good at predicting the outcome of experiment e
when confronted with s, but they will not be able to reliably predict the outcome of e∗, perhaps
because they haven’t yet had significant experience with the e∗/s pair. However, it may be that
they have already noted a strong correlation between the variable V and some variable V ∗ which
they know is predictive of e∗. In this case, it seems that they should be able to use their knowledge
regarding the value of V that corresponds to s to guess a corresponding value for V ∗, which would
then allow them to make an educated guess regarding the outcome of e∗. In future work, we aim to
develop a method for identifying correlations between an agent’s conceptual representations, and
subsequently augment the PS learning dynamics in a way that utilises the observed correlations to
allow for enhanced generalisation abilities.11
A second avenue for further work concerns the number of intermediate clips available to the
agent. Throughout the present work, we have assumed this number to be fixed at a particular value.
This is a significant assumption, which places a-priori restrictions on the kinds of abstractions
that the agents are able to make. In future work, we intend to implement dynamics that allow
the agent to autonomously alter its own architecture in a way that supports whatever kinds of
abstraction are most useful for the learning task in which it is engaged. These dynamics would
allow the agent to change the size of its label space over time as it gains information about the
granularity and complexity of the hidden variables that characterise its environment. For example,
one natural dynamic would be to ‘merge’ any two labels that look like duplicates of one another
(in the sense that they define very similar probability distributions over action space). Another
natural dynamic would be to ‘split in two’ any single label that is deemed to be too general and
imprecise (in the sense that it defines an excessively flat probability distribution over action space).
By implementing dynamics like these, we aim to make the concept formation scheme described
here more autonomous, domain general and robust.
More generally, the present work takes the first steps towards allowing PS agents to au-
tonomously develop symbolic interfaces through which they can articulate, refine and communicate
their distinctive sub-symbolic reasoning dynamics. This opens up a host of new research avenues
pertaining to the further development, integration and application of such interfaces.
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